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ADVANCING EDUCATION THROUGH EDUCATION 
CLAUSES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Robert M Jensen 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments ... It is required in the performance of 
our most basic public responsibilities ... It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de-
nied the opportunity of an education. 1 
The above statement presently raises no real argument. 2 An 
article on such a statement would indeed be void of controversy 
and interest. If American societies have unanimously come to 
respect and value education as an integral part of every child's 
life, then why are state courts encountering a drastic rise in 
education litigation?3 Is there some dissatisfaction with the 
American public school system? Unquestionably, education is 
vital. Unquestionably, education is worth protecting. But the 
question we must ask ourselves is whether our education sys-
tems need protection, and if so, how do we protect them? This 
article presumes the "need" of protecting and advancing the 
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983) 
(citing Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 n.9, (N.Y. 1982) ("the central role 
of education in our society is unquestioned"). 
3. Alexander Natapoff, 1993: The Year of Living Dangerously: State Courts 
Expand the Right to Education, 92 W. Educ. L. Rep. 755, 2 (1994) (at one point in 
the fall of 1994, over half of the states were adjudicating their school finance 
systems). 
1 
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quality of the American school system. 4 With that assumption, 
this article advances to the "how" of education protection. 
The premise of this article is that education litigation best 
advances and protects education when plaintiffs rely heavily on 
the education clause of the state's constitution and make spe-
cific allegations of poor quality and inadequacy. A review of this 
thesis encounters two basic groups of litigants, those seeking 
higher educational quality and those seeking increased equality 
of education taxation, expenditures, or opportunity. 
The equality arguments of school litigation usually raise 
issues of finance, which are legislative in nature. Admittedly, it 
is true that education litigation is inevitably school finance liti-
gation and any suit advancing the cause of education, either on 
qualitative or equalitative grounds, will be interwoven with 
finance system issues. However, plaintiffs arguing the inequal-
ity of the educational system, who proceed to get tangled up in 
the areas of school finance system, often get tangled up in unfa-
vorable adjudications. On the other hand, those plaintiffs, who 
focus intently upon the quality of the educational offering, most 
often find themselves untangling education problems with fa-
vorable adjudications. 
The history of education litigation likewise shows that most 
fruitful suits cut directly to the issue of quality of the educa-
tional offering without getting caught up in the nickel and dime 
issues of the state system. 5 
Part II of this article surveys the different education clauses 
in state constitutions, including their various quantitative, 
qualitative, and equalitative provisions. Part III reviews educa-
tion litigation and illustrates the less successful arguments un-
der state equal protection clauses. Part IV then establishes the 
striking success of the state education clause in conjunction 
with adequacy arguments. These two sections will look closely 
at the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, how 
the courts have responded, and the overall outcome. As liti-
gants often use a combination of equal protection and education 
clause arguments, Part V outlines a hybrid approach to school 
4. ld. at 1, 3, n.16. 
5. Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State 
Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1335 (1992). ("The state constitutions' 
education articles have provided the most fruitful source of independent state 
jurisprudence concerning education.") See also Part IV, A. 
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finance litigation, a method that leans more towards the allega-
tions of inadequacy but incorporates proof and language of in-
equality. Part VI, more specifically establishes the strengths of 
the education clause or adequacy type arguments, and explains 
why the courts are looking for adequacy or qualitative analysis, 
as opposed to the equal protection or equality type analysis. 
Finally, Part VII raises a few questions regarding the specific 
education clauses; whether the success or failure of a given suit 
is dependant on the individual education clause, and if so, to 
what extent. 
The plaintiff who seeks to protect or advance the educa-
tional offering of a given state will be most successful if she re-
lies upon the education clause supported with specific allega-
tions and proof regarding the adequacy or quality of the educa-
tion offered. 
PART II: PREVIEW OF EDUCATION CLAUSES IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
The education clause in the United States Constitution is 
not to be found; the Federal Constitution does not mention edu-
cation. Instead, as stated in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 6 the protection of education, along with 
the duty to define the correlating right is the responsibility of 
the states, under their state constitutions.7 In part, this reli-
ance upon the state constitutions is due to the education 
clauses found in each state's constitution, which are designed to 
provide for and establish a system of public schools. This sec-
tion guides the reader through a survey of the education 
clauses and their various provisions. 
A. EDUCATION CLAUSES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
All fifty state constitutions contain an education clause de-
signed to establish some form of educational system. These 
clauses have created a wave of successful litigation protecting 
and advancing school systems across the nation.8 Although dif-
ferent clauses, with different language and emphasis, will argu-
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
7. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 9-10. See also Part III, A. 
8. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
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ably offer different amounts and forms of educational protec-
tion, it seems clear that most education clauses have been an 
integral part behind successful education litigation and the 
quality of subsequent educational offerings. 9 
Each education clause has its strengths and weaknesses; 
some are more precise and lengthy, while others are vague and 
short. Some education clauses seem to establish a clear quality 
of education, while others are void of any distinct qualitative 
phrases whatsoever. The absence, abundance, and variety of 
qualitative phrases in specific state constitutions is wide-rang-
mg. 
B. SPECIFIC QUALITATIVE PHRASES 
The most effective language of state constitutions found in 
the efforts advancing and protecting the educational offering 
will inevitably be that which prescribes a high level of educa-
tional quality. Indeed, those states with the strongest "quality 
phrases" have offered some of the leading cases in the advance-
ment of education. 10 The most familiar phrases, and certainly 
the most common qualitative phrase of education clauses, are 
those which emphasize the standard of quality or the "quality 
statement" for the state's school system. These quality state-
ments vary from challenging levels of quality to nonexistent 
levels. Such quality statements are found in over half of the 
education clauses. They include such standards as: "high qual-
ity,"11 "efficient system of high quality," 12 "efficient," 13 "general 
and efficient,"J.l "thorough and efficient," 15 "general and uni-
9. See Part VU. 
10. For example, seP Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 
(N.D. 1994); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Pauley v. Kelly, 
255 S.E.2d 859 ('.V.Va. 1979); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 0Vash. 
1978). Other states with language as equally strong have either not contested their 
educational clause, such as, Del., Haw., Iowa, Miss., Nev., Utah, Vt. (see PERCEY E. 
BURRUP, FINANCING EDUCATION IN A CLIMATE OF CHANGE 232 (1996), or have done so 
without a focus on quality of education, see, for example, McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 
S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994), People ex 
rei. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976). 
11. ILL. CONST. art. X, §1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, §1. 
12. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
13. KY. CONST. §183; TEX. CONST. art. VII, §1. 
14. DEL. CONST. art. X, §1. 
15. MD. CONST. art. VIII, §1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII §1; N.J. CONST. art VIII, 
§4; OHIO CONST. art VI, §2; PA. CONST. art III, §14; W.VA. CONST. art. XII, §1. 
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form," 16 "thorough and uniform," 17 "general, uniform, and thor-
ough,"18 "complete and uniform," 19 "liberal,"20 "basic,"21 "compe-
tent,"22 and "suitable."23 Though such quality statements are 
the most common, they are not always the most helpful. Some 
quality statements, in fact, contain the least helpful language, 
establishing a minimal commitment without a quality stan-
dard, such as "uniform,"24 or even, "as nearly uniform as practi-
cal."25 Fifteen states have no quality statement at all, establish-
ing a commitment only in terms of the existence of a system 
without any given standard. 26 
C. GOAL, PURPOSE, DUTY 
In addition to the main "quality statement," several state 
constitutions contain other qualitative phrases with unique 
depth. Washington's education clause, for instance, contains 
language which places Washington's educational duty above all 
other state duties.27 The clause states that, "It is the paramount 
duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of 
the children residing within its borders."28 Akin to Washing-
ton's strong language is Illinois': "A fundamental goal of the 
People of the State is the educational development of all per-
sons to the limits of their capacities."29 The constitutions of 
16. ARIZ. CONST. art. XI §1; IND. CONST. art. VIII §1; MINN. CoNST. art. XIII, 
§1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §2; OR. CONST. art. VIII, §3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, §1; WASH. 
CONST. art. IX, §2. 
17. COLO. CONST. art. IX, §2. 
18. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
19. WYO. CONST. art. VII, §1. 
20. ALA. CONST. §256. 
21. MONT. CONST. art X, §1. 
22. VT. CONST. ch. 2, §68. 
23. ME. CONST. art. VIII, §1. 
24. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
25. WIS. CONST. art. X, §3. 
26. Such states included: Alaska, Conn., Haw., Kan., La., Miss., Mich., Mo., 
N.H., N.Y., Okla., R.I., S.C., Tenn., and Va. It should be noted however, that 
even education clauses with empty quality statements, have often 
been interpreted by the courts to carry qualitative suggestions, such 
as "a sound basic education." For example, see Bd. of Educ. V. 
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). See also note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
27. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). 
28. WASH. CON ST. art. IX, pmbl. 
29. ILL. CONST. art. V1II, § 1. 
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Georgia, Louisiana, and Montana have similar wording. 30 This 
type of qualitative language is standard-setting language, es-
tablishing constitutional levels of quality which must be re-
flected in the state's educational offering. Arguments based on 
such language are ideally the type for which the courts are 
looking.31 
Other state constitutions also reflect the high prominence of 
education with the command "to cherish," or "to encourage," or 
both. 32 Or, as with Tennessee's education clause: "the state rec-
ognizes the inherent value of education."33 With slightly less 
vigor, other states require the adoption of "all suitable means to 
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of educa-
tion."34 
D. DELINEATED SUBJECTS 
Some state education clauses actually delineate specific sub-
jects or areas of emphasis upon which the education system 
should focus: "Intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific 
improvement."35 Two states require the emphasis of cultural 
education, 36 and others require the emphasis of moral or reli-
30. GA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 ("The provision of an adequate public education for 
the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia"); LA. CONST. art. 
VIII, pmbl. ("The goal of the public educational system is to provide learning 
environments and experiences, at all stages of human development, that are humane, 
just, and designed to promote excellence in order that every individual may be 
afforded an equal opportunity to develop to his full potential"); MONT. CONST. art X, 
§1 ("it is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will develop 
the full educational potential of each person"). 
31. See supra Part IV. 
32. MAss. CONST. ch. V, §2; N.H. CONST. Pt. 2 art. 88 (modeled after Mass.); 
WYO. CONST. art. I, §23; CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 1; IOWA 
CONST. art. IX, §3; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §1 (same as 
Mich.). 
33. TENN. CONST. art. XI, §21. 
34. ARK CONST. art. XIV, §1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, §1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, §L 
35. The most extensive delineation is found in N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 
("literature and the sciences . . . agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, 
manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the 
principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry, 
and economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, 
and generous sentiments among the people"). See also KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; IOWA 
CONST. art. IX, §3; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, §2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, §201; N.D. 
CONST. art. VIII, §3. 
36. HAW. CONST. art. X, §1 ("The State shall promote the study of Hawaiian 
culture, history and language"); MONT. CONST. art. X, §1 ("The state recognizes the 
distinct and unique cultural heritage of the American Indians and is committed in 
its educational goals to the preservation of their cultural integrity"). 
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gious education. 37 Although the delineation of subjects is not 
specifically a statement of quality, courts have considered it as 
such, stating that it is a model of thoroughness and importance 
which the legislature must address in establishing the state's 
qualitative standard of education.38 
E. GOVERNMENT, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND HAPPINESS 
Many state constitutions also contain phrases recognizing 
the role of education in the protection of government, rights, 
liberties, and happiness. Although such statements may not 
establish any standard of educational quality, per se, they do 
note the purpose and importance of education. For example, 
North Dakota's education clause states: 
A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and moral-
ity on the part of every voter in a government by the people 
being necessary in order to insure the continuance of that gov-
ernment and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the 
legislative assembly shall make provision for the establish-
ment and maintenance of a system of public schools.39 
Fourteen other state constitutions contain variations of this 
wording.40 Such phrases have been relied on as one important 
part of the education clause for the protection of education. 41 
F. NON-QUALITATIVE PHRASES 
State education clauses are not made up solely of qualita-
tive phrases. In fact, the majority of education clause language 
deals with administrative matters or specific issues of the edu-
cation system apart from quality. 
37. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §1; VT. CONST. ch. 11, §68. 
38. For example, see McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993), Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, 110 
(Ala. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). 
39. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §1. 
40. ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, §1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, 
§1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, §1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, §1; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, §2; 
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, §1; MO. CONST. art. IX, §1; N.H. 
CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §1; R.I. CONST. 
art. XII, §1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, §1; TEX. CONST. art. VII, §1. 
41. For example, see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 
(Cal. 1976). 
8 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1997 
For instance, one important provision appearing in at least 
ten of the state constitutions, with varying degrees of specific-
ity, is the non-discrimination phrase.42 Without discounting the 
importance of such language, the nondiscrimination phrase has 
a limited application. Although it has been extremely useful in 
protecting the individual upon grounds of race, nationality, reli-
gion, etc., it has not been used by plaintiffs nor held by courts to 
provide the protection or advancement of education necessary 
to ensure the quality of the overall educational outcome. Simi-
larly, many state constitutions contain language of uniformity, 
again, nonqualitative statements, and again statements which 
have proven to hold little value for the advancement of educa-
tional quality. 43 Other valuable provisions, though not specifi-
cally for the protection of quality, include those insuring the 
education of the deaf, mute, and blind, or establishing compul-
sory attendance, the general elements of the finance system, or 
administrative responsibilities. 
Recognizing that each state constitution contains a unique 
education clause provides additional ground on which to syn-
thesize various judicial opinions. Some states have combined all 
of the strongest qualitative language, while other states seem 
to be lacking everything vital to the advancement or protection 
of education. Nonetheless, the weakness of the education clause 
is not as detrimental as is the weakness of plaintiff's choice of 
arguments because courts are continually recognizing the in-
herent value of quality education. Additionally, the courts are 
recognizing the state education clauses as a sign of the value 
states place on education.44 
PART III: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS: A SEMI-SUCCESSFUL 
TRADITION. 
42. For instance, see ILL. CONST. art. X, §1 ("Educational development of all 
persons"); MONT. CONST. art. X, §7 ("guaranteed to each person of the state"); N.M. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("open to all the children of school age"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 
("all the children of the State may be educated"); WASH. CONST. art. IX, §2 ("for ... 
the children residing within its borders without distinction or preference on account 
of race, color, caste, or sex ... free from sectarian control and open to all children 
in [the) state"). See also ARK. CONST. art. XIV, §1; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §1; HAW. 
CONST. art. X, §1; MASS. CONST. art. 61; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §2; N.J. CONST. art. 
VIII, §4. 
43. See infra Part III, B. 
44. See infra Part VII. 
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Interestingly, education litigation has been termed "school 
finance litigation" rather than "school system litigation." Per-
haps this is because the most common theory of school finance 
litigation under an equal protection clause, requires plaintiffs 
to argue that some aspect of the finance system creates inequal-
ity or some nonuniformity. (Hereinafter "equal protec-
tion/equality claims"). School finance litigation may be mis-
named in light of the more successful and increasingly common 
argument, under the state education clause, which allows 
plaintiffs to assert that the educational offering a child receives 
is somehow inadequate. (Hereinafter "education 
clause/adequacy claims"). The next three sections provide an 
explanation of equal protection/equality claims, education 
clause/adequacy claims, and a sort of hybrid claim made up of a 
mixture of the two. In doing so, these sections establish a 
rather clear and distinct correlation between successful litiga-
tion and arguments that go beyond the financial elements, be-
yond the equality aspects of the taxation, expenditures, and 
educational opportunities, and reach out to the quality or ade-
quacy aspects of the educational output. 
This section will address two types of equality arguments: 
equal protection/equality claims and equal protec-
tion/uniformity claims. Equal protection/equality claims arise 
from the state or federal equal protection clause, and equal pro-
tection/uniformity claims arise from the state education clause. 
Other than their point of origin, there is no real difference be-
tween the two, neither in terms of analysis or effect, and for 
that reason the two types are addressed together under an ex-
planation of equal protection. 
A. EQUAL PROTECTION/EQUALITY CLAIMS. 
Undoubtedly, the most prevalent school finance litigation 
theory is the equal protection argument based in terms of in-
equalities. In fact, equal protection arguments have been sug-
gested in all but five cases. 45 However, as will be shown, equal-
45. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); 
McDuffy v. Secetary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Rose v. Council for 
Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 
71 (Wash. 1978). See also Appendix. 
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ity arguments alone have established, at best, only a semi-suc-
cessful method of protection and advancement of education and 
school finance systems. The courts have not given equality ar-
guments the weight that plaintiffs and scholars had hoped. 
We can quickly dispose of equal protection arguments aris-
ing under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
under which probably no school finance system will ever be 
overturned in the future. This is due to San Antonio Independ-
ent School District u. Rodriguez, a seminal case, argued before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 46 That case, strictly a finance case, 
concerned solely with disparities in per-pupil expenditures, 
failed under the federal Equal Protection analysis because edu-
cation was not a "fundamental right"47 recognized by the Con-
stitution and because the educationally disadvantaged poor did 
not constitute a "suspect classification."48 Based on a mere ra-
tional basis scrutiny, the Court refused to overturn the school 
finance system on grounds of inequality. Equally notable, this 
dispositive case "virtually abdicated any role for the federal 
courts in guaranteeing educational rights under the Federal 
Constitution,"49 leaving future plaintiffs "to state courts and 
constitutions for the change they seek."50 
In state courts under state equal protection clauses, the his-
tory of school finance litigation has, to a large extent, continued 
in the unsuccessful ruts of Rodriguez and the grounds of equal-
ity. 
In most states, courts have interpreted [their state] equality 
guarantees to be substantially equivalent to the federal Equal 
Protection Clause .... Many state courts use the federal equal 
protection framework to give the equality guarantees of their 
respective state constitutions an equivalent effect. Other state 
courts follow the federal equal protection framework, but uti-
lize different tests for detecting fundamental rights and sus-
pect classifications. A few state courts have adopted their own 
46. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
47. ld. at 30. 
48. ld. at 25. 
49. Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1329. See also Richard J. Stark, Education Reform· 
Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequac;y 
us. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 609 (1992). 
50. See Natapoff, supra note 3, at 4 (referring to "a backdrop of federal judicial 
hostility to education rights," footnoting Rodriguez). See also Hubsch, supra note 5, 
at 1342; Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101, 105 (1995). 
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independent interpretations of constitutional equality guaran-
tees.51 
II 
Of the cases directly mirroring the Rodriquez approach on a 
state level, three of four California cases, have overturned the 
school finance system.52 At least seven others have failed. 53 
1. Serrano u. Priest, ("Serrano !').54 The California Supreme 
Court, prior to Rodriguez, held, under the federal and Califor-
nia equal protection clauses, that education was a fundamental 
interest, 55 and that the poor are a suspect classification. 56 Upon 
such holdings, the court applied strict scrutiny and overturned 
the state school finance system, because the system resulted in 
wide disparities in funding per pupil and substantially de-
pended on local property taxes. "We have determined that this 
funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor be-
cause it makes the quality of a child's education a function of 
the wealth of his parents and neighbors."57 No evidence was 
offered regarding the quality of any child's education, only the 
inequality of the method of taxation. 
2. Serrano u. Priest, ("Serrano 1!').58 The legislature's re-
sponse to Serrano I was found to be insufficient. The court's 
opinion reestablished its previous decision, clarifying-in light 
of Rodriguez which renounced strict scrutiny in such cases un-
der the federal Equal Protection Clause-that Serrano I was 
based on the equal protection clause of the California state con-
stitution as well as the federal Constitution. 59 Although the de-
fendants requested that the state look at more substantive mat-
51. Stark, supra note 49, at 22 (citations omitted). 
52. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I, overturned); Serrano 
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II, overturned); Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 
1240 (Cal. 1992) (overturned). 
53. City of Powtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Jenkins v. Leininger, 
1995 WL 758757 (Ill. App. 1995)(upheld, "This court uses the same analysis in 
assessing equal protection claims brought under the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions"); Serrano v. Priest 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1986) (Serrano III, 
upheld); Sch. Admin. Dist. v. Comm'r Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 n.5 (Me. 
1996); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229, v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (upheld); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (upheld); Lujan 
v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (1982) (upheld). 
54. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
55. ld. at 1258. 
56. Id. at 1255. 
57. ld. at 1244. 
58. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
59. ld. at 958. 
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ters such as the "adequacy and equality of the educational pro-
grams," the court refused to ascertain more than Serrano I, 
stating that if a system was discriminatory-basing revenues 
and quality on wealth-it was unconstitutional regardless of 
educational outcome.60 
3. Serrano v. Priest, ("Serrano Ill'). 61 Having reviewed the 
state's school finance system history along with Serrano I and 
Serrano II, the California Supreme Court held, via the adoption 
of the trial court opinion, that the legislature had decreased 
per-pupil expenditure disparities to "insignificant" levels.62 
Again, no new issues were raised. 
4. Butt v. State. 63 One California school district had ex-
hausted its funds and sought to close school six weeks early. 
The Supreme Court of California granted an injunction, restat-
ing the holding of previous decisions that the students of Cali-
fornia have a "constitutional right to basic educational equality 
with other public school students in this state."64 
These California opinions, are models of successful equal 
protection/equality arguments following the federal equal pro-
tection analysis used in Rodriguez. However, they are not rep-
resentative of the whole. In fact these opinions represent less 
than a thirty percent success rate. 65 Additionally, as one author 
points out, the California court having "strained to avoid cast-
ing the issue in adequacy terms," has left California "confronted 
with the problems of inadequacy."66 From the language of these 
California opinions, one would have a difficult time rallying any 
substantial protection for the quality of a child's education. And 
this is not because California lacks an education clause, or be-
cause it lacks a strong eduction clause, but simply because Cali-
fornia plaintiffs and courts have not addressed the problem 
with any qualitative measurement whatsoever. 
Even when states do not follow the Rodriguez approach and 
apply their own equal protection analysis to their state consti-
tution, plaintiffs' equality claims continue to be unsuccessful. 67 
60. Id. at 944. 
61. 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1986). 
62. Id. at 620. 
63. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992). 
64. Id. 
65. See supra note 53. 
66. Enrich, supra note 50, at 114. 
67. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of equal protection, from Brown 
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Even under independent state equal protection analysis, state 
courts are still responding as did the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez: "the existence of 'some inequality' ... is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system."68 This re-
luctance to require equality marks the majority of all state deci-
sions, as it did in the federal equal protection field. 69 Nonethe-
less, plaintiffs continue the traditional equality arguments. 
Although funding disparities are often easily proven and 
facts are often readily available, state courts have consistently 
held that equal protection clauses do not require strict equality 
of funding. 70 With proof of extensive inequalities, the supreme 
court of North Carolina held that disparities in funding did not 
give rise to an equal protection violation.71 Though education 
was declared a "fundamental right," educational expenditures 
did not need to be administered in "absolute uniformity."72 The 
case was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Other courts 
have simply explained "that disparities in funding per pupil 
were simply not a concern to those who drafted the provi-
sions."73 
Disparities and inequalities in educational opportunities, as 
opposed to funding, have likewise not been required under state 
equal protection arguments. 74 One supreme court stated, "[I]n 
our view, the only plausible way to interpret [the phrase "equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students,"] is to relate it 
v. Bd. of Educ. to the present school finance litigation cases, see generally Enrich, 
supra note 50. 
68. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51. 
69. Although this section will illustrate the reluctance of the courts to require 
equality, see generally Appendix for the unsuccessful nature of equality·based claims. 
70. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities 
Today v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1993); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. 
State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 
(1982); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Penn. 1979); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 
635 (Idaho 1975). 
71. Britt v. North Carolina, 357 S.E.2d 432 (1987). 
72. !d. at 436. 
73. Pawtucket v. Sunland, 662 A.2d 40, 49 (R.I. 1995). See also Pauley v. Kelly, 
255 S.E.2d 859, 870 (W.Va. 1979) ("equality of funding has not been required in the 
majority of states with mandated thorough and efficient school systems"). 
74. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 199 A.D.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. 
1993); Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) ("need not be 
strictly equal or precisely uniform"); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d. 156, 168 (Ga. 
1981) (neither the equal protection nor education clause "require the state to equalize 
educational opportunities between districts"). But see Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 
(Conn. 1977). 
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to the 'separate but equal' phrase," as a nondiscrimination 
clause, establishing only "equal access," not equal outcome.75 
There are a few exceptions, one of which lies with a state whose 
education clause explicitly requires equality of opportunity. 76 
Most courts have simply held that inequality of opportunity 
or funding is allowed as long as the educational offering is ade-
quate,77 while others have required that equal protection claims 
be accompanied by "gross and glaring" inequalities before over-
turning a school finance system. 78 For example, an Idaho court 
cited several cases standing for the single proposition that ab-
sent a showing of inadequate education, inequality in expendi-
tures is not sufficient to summon an overturning of the state 
school finance system. 79 In other words, equality arguments 
alone have not carried the day. 
5. Gould u. Orr. 8° Facing a school finance system similar to 
that found in the Serrano cases, with high dependance on local 
tax revenues, substantial disparity among property wealth, and 
resulting inequities in per pupil funding, the Nebraska court 
took the more typical approach and held that neither the equal-
ity of taxation nor spending was mandated. Even assuming all 
pleaded facts were true, plaintiffs failed to state a cause of ac-
tion.81 The court redundantly demanded that equalitative argu-
ments and evidence were of themselves meritless; the court 
wanted allegations and proof regarding "inadequate schooling," 
"the quality of education" and "the education each student is 
receiving."82 
6. Exira Community School District u. State.83 Plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of an open enrollment statute 
which required the district from which the students were leav-
ing ("sending district") to release funds to the receiving district. 
Plaintiffs, the sending district, argued that the finance system 
75. Britt v . North Carolina, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1987). 
76. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989) 
(citing MONT. CONST. art. VIII, §1). 
77. For example, see Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 311 (1993); Hornbeck 
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983). 
78. For example, see Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 199 A.D.2d 
488, 489 (1993). 
79. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 651 (Idaho 1975). 
80. 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993). 
81. ld. at 352. 
82. ld. at 353. 
83. 512 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1994). 
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violated the state equal protection clause and the state due pro-
cess clause because of the inequalities in expenditures.84 Plain-
tiffs offered no facts regarding the quality of education, and the 
court explained that "[the plaintiffs] do not even pretend to ar-
gue that the financing mechanisim-even with the $70,000 
shortfall to Exira-is preventing Exira from providing an ade-
quate education to the students who remain."85 The court there-
fore refused plaintiffs' claims. 
7. Thompson u. Engelking. 86 In the Idaho school finance sys-
tem, local ad valorem taxes raised the majority of the revenue 
creating inequitable per-pupil funding. However, the court re-
fused to allow strict scrutiny of the school finance system under 
equal protection analysis and allowed for inequalities within 
that system. Likewise, the court held that the education clause 
did not "guarantee to the children of this state a right to be edu-
cated in such a manner that all services and facilities are equal 
throughout the State."87 After discarding plaintiffs claims, the 
court concluded by noting that plaintiffs only alleged an in-
equality of funding, and did not proceed to demonstrate an in-
adequacy of funding to maintain that system of education.88 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION/UNIFORMITY CLAIMS: A SLIGHT 
VARIATION. 
Many equality claims are brought under the state's educa-
tion clause rather than the state's equal protection clause. With 
the same basic equality focus, the state education clauses often 
have a semi-equal protection argument couched in terms of 
"uniformity."89 With this language plaintiffs essentially have 
another equality claim with which to argue that the taxation, 
expenditure, or opportunity per pupil or per district is not equal 
or uniform as required.90 Such arguments are equal protec-
tion/equality arguments though brought under the education 
84. Id. at 794. 
85. Id. at 795. 
86. 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975). 
87. Id. at 647. 
88. Id. at 653. 
89. See supra Part II, B. 
90. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1993) 
(equality of funding not required, constitution only requires equality of access); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 485 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 
505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993). 
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clause. This article only distinguishes such arguments as equal 
protection/uniformity arguments. 
To bolster their unsuccessful equality-based claims, plain-
tiffs have incorporated the "uniformity" language of education 
clauses. These uniformity claims however, have been even less 
successful,91 as the courts have construed the education clause 
uniformity requirements even more restrictively than equality 
requirements under equal protection. In fact, "no court has 
found that such a uniformity requirement guarantees equality 
of educational funding." 92 Idaho has actually "concluded that 
Thompson and cases decided after Thompson mandate dis-
missal of the uniformity claim."93 
1. Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson. 94 The state school finance 
system which relied heavily upon local tax revenues and cre-
ated large disparities among districts, was upheld. Neither the 
"uniformity" language of the education clause nor the equal pro-
tection clause required uniformity or equality of educational 
facilities, opportunities or expenditures. 95 
2. Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State. 96 In re-
sponse to the legislative action taken, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon once again held "that school districts may have dispa-
rate amounts to fund schools, depending on the amount that 
voters are willing to pay,"97 but the "uniform" language of the 
education clause did not require otherwise. 
3. Withers v. State. 98 The Oregon Supreme Court decided 
this case in accordance with Oregon's two earlier opinions. The 
plaintiff made "precisely the same arguments that the court 
rejected in Olsen."99 Again, equal protection/equality and uni-
formity arguments brought failure, and the courts in this case 
explained why: "plaintiffs do not complain that current funding 
91. Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1336 n.98 ("Plaintiffs have had less success making 
claims under the education articles of the state constitution where they have used the 
education article as a surrogate for, or reiteration of, an equal protection claim"). 
92. Stark, supra note 49, at 630; see also Unified Sch. Dist. No. 299 v. State, 
885 P.2d 1170,1184 (Kan. 1994) (citing the language of twelve state supreme court 
opinions holding to this effect); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). 
93. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 730 (1993); 
See also Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993). 
94. 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976). 
95. ld. at 148. 
96. 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991). 
97. ld. at 121. 
98. 891 P.2d 675 (Or. 1995). 
99. ld. at 679. 
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is inadequate to ensure that they receive the minimum educa-
tion required by law."100 
4. Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District 
v. Nyquist. 101 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the school 
finance system, even with "significant inequalities,"102 as the 
state provided a minimum fault grant per pupil that estab-
lished education at state standards. 103 Any disparities beyond 
the state level was not unconstitutional, the court held, neither 
under the state equal protection clause nor under the "unifor-
mity" type language of the education clause. 104 
5. Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today v. 
Cuomo. 105 In a page and a half opinion, the court precisely de-
clared: "Since the plaintiffs in this case merely assert that there 
are disparities in the financing of rich and poor school districts, 
and the Court of Appeals has already determined that the 
Levittown case that such disparities are not unconstitutional, 
we find that the complaint was properly dismissed." 106 Without 
reference to any specific facts, the court concluded that the 
school finance system did not contain any "gross and glaring 
inadequacies,"107 and further that "plaintiffs do not allege that 
their students are not being provided with a sound, basic educa-
tion."108 
As these cases illustrate, equal protection/uniformity 
claims, like equal protection/equality claims, have proven to be 
rather unsuccessful. Although more uniformity and equality 
claims have been tried in courts, almost twice as many as edu-
cation clause/adequacy claims, fewer plaintiffs overall have 
found favorable verdicts from such uniformity and equality 
based claims. 109 Even when plaintiffs holster their equal protec-
tion claims with simultaneous uniformity claims, 110 and due 
100. Id. 
101. 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). 
102. Id. at 363. 
103. Id. at 368. 
104. Id. 
105. 199 A.D.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
106. Id. at 490. 
107. Id. at 489. 
108. Id. at 490. 
109. Again, only ten out of thirty-eight cases decided solely on grounds of 
equality have overturned school finance systems or remanded favorably to plaintiffs, 
for a total of twenty-six percent success. See generally, Appendix. 
110. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d (RI. 1995) (good example of a 
defendant's case, pro equality). 
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process claims as well. Still, plaintiffs have not found much suc-
cess absent an argument that cuts to the issue of the adequacy 
of the educational offering. 111 Notwithstanding the fact that the 
dominant financial aspects of equality claims have been proven 
less than nominally successful, plaintiffs have continually em-
phasized disparity and inequality of the financial aspects of 
education. This, according to one scholar's thorough treatment 
of the subject, is a result of the nation's continued overreliance 
on the historical success of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 112 
Arguably, these plaintiffs simply want to give their child a 
better education, a greater opportunity to compete well with 
others. 113 "School finance litigation" plaintiffs really want qual-
ity, not just equality. 114 
PART IV: EDUCATION CLAUSE/ADEQUACY CLAIMS: WHAT COURTS 
ARE LOOKING FOR. 
At first glance, one might judge the success of a school fi-
nance suit to be as predictable as the toss of a coin. Indeed, sim-
ple addition shows that plaintiffs challenging the school finance 
system receive almost as many favorable as unfavorable judg-
ments.115 However, the adequacy argument is a much more suc-
cessful avenue of advancing education than through the equal 
protection/equality or equal protection/uniformity arguments 
outlined above. Such adequacy claims are brought under the 
education clause of the state constitutions. And though the fed-
eral Constitution does not have an education article or any ref-
erence to education, state constitutions are specially equipped 
for education litigation. Sometimes they even have extensive 
education clauses or explicit and mandatory levels of quality. 116 
111. See generally, Appendix. 
112. Enrich, supra note 50, at 116. 
113. See generally, Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 
1989)("Edgewood I")( equality measured strangely in almost qualitative terms regarding 
the ability to compete). 
114. Stark, supra note 49, at 613. 
115. See Appendix (forty-four percent of school finance cases have been favorable 
to plaintiffs); see also Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 
814, 815 (Ariz. 1994) (citing eleven cases overturned, sixteen upheld); Fair Sch. Fin. 
Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1148 (Okla. 1987) (citing eight cases overturned, ten 
upheld). 
116. Stark, supra note 49, at 613. See also supra Part II. 
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These constitutional qualitative standards allow plaintiffs to 
advance their arguments in terms of the actual adequacy or 
quality of the educational offering rather than in terms of com-
parison, one district against another, on difficult financial 
equalitative terms. 
Contrary to what a few uninformed courts and scholars 
have concluded, 117 there is consistency between success and the 
use of the education clause. Further and deeper analysis shows 
a strong correlation between favorable verdicts and the educa-
tion clause when argued properly with allegations and proof of 
educational inadequacy. 
A. STATISTICAL SUCCESS OF THE EDUCATION CLAUSE. 
Courts have found the state school system to be unconstitu-
tional in each challenge to state school system, based on an ed-
ucation clause claim coupled with adequate proof of an inade-
quate education. 118 These cases have been decided exclusively 
upon the grounds of the education clause, without any defer-
ence whatsoever to equality arguments under equal protec-
tion.119 At least another seven cases have been decided squarely 
on adequacy grounds, while giving minimal lip service to equal-
ity considerations.120 In one opinion, after plaintiffs had 
dropped their education clause claim, the court itself incorpo-
rated an education clause analysis, in conjunction with that of 
equal protection, to overturn the school finance system. 121 Still 
117. See, e.g., Lonnie Harp, No Clear Trend Seen in Recent Finance Decisions, 
EDUCATION WEEK, May 4, 1994. 
118. See Appendix. 
119. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Idaho Sch. for 
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of 
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. 
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 
186 (Ky. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). See also 
Enrich, supra note 50, at 174 (referring specifically to the latter three cases and also 
commenting very positively on the first two, as well as Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 
859 (W.Va. 1979)). 
120. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Roosevelt 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 V. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Alabama Coalitirn 
for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1993); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. 
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 
391 (Tex. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Pauley v. Kelly, 324 
S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1984). See Enrich, supra note 50, at Appendix. The remaining six 
cases were decided unfavorably toward plaintiffs, due to lack of evidence. 
121. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 260-63 (N.D. 1994) 
(plaintiff dropped its education clause claim, but court incorporated, on its own, 
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other cases have upheld the school finance system on other 
grounds, but with language favorable to the education clause. 122 
On the other hand, in the last fifteen years only three courts 
have overturned a school finance system without an education 
clause argument. 123 
Several scholars have recognized the strength of quality-
based arguments, but few have recognized the extent of the 
clause's success. Although approximately forty-five percent of 
all school finance litigants receive favorable verdicts, 124 those 
relying solely on equality arguments have been less than thirty 
percent successful. 125 Those plaintiffs relying on a hybrid of 
both education clause adequacy claims and equal protection 
clause equality claims have about a sixty-six percent success 
rate, 126 while those plaintiffs relying solely on the education 
clause adequacy arguments have sustained a one hundred per-
cent success rate. 127 That rate of success for education 
clause/adequacy arguments is even greater if one accounts for 
opinions with language favorable to the education clause, and 
plaintiffs who simply didn't have the facts to carry the court to 
an ultimately favorable decision. 128 
qualitative analysis focusing on evidence of strong inadequacy and, in many respects, 
the court recognized a hybrid claim outlining the poor quality and the poor level of 
funding responsible). 
122. See, e.g., Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d (Tex. 1995). 
123. Exira Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787 Oowa 1994); Butt v. 
State, 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 
P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). cf. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 
1994). 
124. Approximately sixty-one cases have been decided; twenty-seven of those 
overturned the school finance system or remanded favorably to plaintiffs; see also 
Appendix. 
125. Only ten of the thirty-eight cases decided solely on grounds of equality have 
overturned school finance systems or remanded favorably to plaintiffs, for a total of 
twenty-six percent success; see also Appendix. 
126. In all, eighteen cases have been decided on a hybrid (equality/adequacy) 
basis. Twelve of those have overturned the school finance system or have been 
remanded favorably; see also Appendix. 
127. Although all five cases decided solely on grounds of adequacy have 
overturned the school finance system, when added to hybrid cases arguing on grounds 
of both adequacy and equality, seventeen of the twenty-three cases have been decided 
favorably toward plaintiffs. Therefore, of all cases decided, in part, upon an education 
clause/adequacy basis, seventy-four percent have been successful; see also Appendix. 
128. See Appendix (all five cases argued solely on gounds of adequacy were 
successful, thirteen of the hybrid cases were successful, and the remaining six were 
unsuccessful due to lack of evidence). 
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B. COURTS WANTING QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS. 
Moving beyond statistics, the language of the nation's judi-
ciaries confirms these conclusions. Many courts have explicitly 
stated that they are looking for the qualitative language of edu-
cation clauses, specifically asking plaintiffs to direct their argu-
ments accordingly. 
For instance, in a Nebraska case such a preference was re-
dundantly stated in three consecutive sentences, after the court 
refused to recognize plaintiff's cause of action: 
Appellants' petition clearly claims there is disparity in fund-
ing among school districts, but does not specifically allege any 
assertion that such disparity in funding is inadequate and 
results in inadequate schooling. While appellant's petition is 
replete with examples of disparity among the various school 
districts in Nebraska, they fail to allege in their petition how 
these disparities affect the quality of education the students 
are receiving. In other words, although appellants' petition 
alleges the system of funding is unequal, there is no demon-
stration that the education each student is receiving does not 
meet constitutional requirements. 129 
Along the same lines as this Nebraska opinion, other courts 
have frequently rejected equal protection arguments for educa-
tion clause arguments when plaintiffs have presented both. 130 
Likewise, where plaintiffs have relied solely on equality claims, 
courts have frequently expressed surprise at plaintiffs' com-
plete failure to allege poor quality of education, and the court 
stated such as the grounds for unfavorable judgments. 131 This 
was the case with one Iowa opinion: "The appellants do not 
even pretend to argue that the financing mechanism ... is pre-
venting [the school district] from providing an adequate educa-
tion to the students."132 
129. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993). 
130. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 
516 (Mass. 1993), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993), Rose 
v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 
273 (N.J. 1973). 
131. Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1336 (citing to Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. 
of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 780 (Md. 1983) and Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 711, 719 
(Mich. 1973). See also Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); 
Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302 
(Minn. 1993). 
132. Exira Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 795 (Iowa 1994). 
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Thus education clauses are becoming the school finance the-
ory of choice. Statistics show they are more successful, scholars 
agree. 133 Judicial opinions continually work towards the lan-
guage of quality and away from the language of equality. There 
are several reasons for the strength of this education 
clause/adequacy argument. First, adequacy arguments cut to 
the core of what most plaintiffs want and what most courts are 
sympathetic to: a child's educational experience. 134 Second, ade-
quacy arguments are more justiciable and less legislative; 
courts are more willing and anxious to insure that a student 
gets an adequate education, than that a student gets an educa-
tion exactly like that of another student. 135 Third, adequacy ar-
guments are said to be more manageable. 136 Courts have been 
willing to require an adequate education. Requiring equality, 
however, brings taxation, expenditures, curricula, facilities, 
etc., under regulation. It is far more difficult to require that 
each school be equal, than to require that they all meet at least 
a certain qualitative standard. 
1. Seattle School District No. 1 of King County u. Washing-
ton.137 The Washington Supreme Court issued a decision which 
required the state to increase school funding and refrain from 
relying on special excess levies, generating additional local 
taxes, to fund the school system. The opinion does not suggest 
any glaring educational inadequacies except the inability to 
maintain a twenty-to-one student-teacher ratio, and the 
underfunding of the school district as analyzed under three sep-
arate tests. 138 The court held-qualitatively on equalitative 
evidence-that the state's method of funding did not provide 
"ample provision" for even a "basic education," let alone a "gen-
eral and uniform" education as required by the state's educa-
tion clause.139 The court also held the constitutional language 
requiring education to be "the paramount duty of the state"140 to 
133. Stark, supra note 49, at 630; Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1336; Enrich, supra 
note 50, at 103. 
134. See infra Part VI, B, addressing this point specifically. 
135. See infra Part VI, A, addressing this point specifically. 
136. See Rovinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 283 (N.J. 1973) (refusing to consider 
equal protection arguments due to unmanageability). 
137. 585 P.2d 71 (1978). 
138. ld. at 103. 
139. ld. at 99. 
140. ld. at 91. 
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be mandatory language creating an "absolute right" in every 
child. 141 The court relied only upon the state's education clause 
in declaring the school finance system unconstitutionaL 
2. Pauley v. Kelly. 142 The West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals reinstated plaintiff's cause of action which the lower 
court had dismissed, after noting the lower court's findings of 
inadequacies in physical facilities, even extending to "potential 
health and safety threats," and inequalities suggesting inade-
quacies in facilities, curricula, test scores from poorer school 
districts. 143 Although the court did devote some deference to 
equal protection/equality based arguments, it devoted the ma-
jority of its opinion to defining and assessing the language of 
the education clause, including the "terms that are basic to the 
case: 'thorough,' 'efficient,' and 'education.' "144 Mter looking ex-
tensively at other relevant jurisdictions and agreeing with the 
adequacy standards found mandatory in over fifteen states, 145 
the court continued, "[w]e may now define a thorough and effi-
cient system of schools: it develops, as best the state of educa-
tion expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of 
its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, 
recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.'' 146 There-
after the court delineated eight various "legally recognized ele-
ments" of education. 147 
3. Rose v. Council for Better Education, Jnc. 148 Although the 
Plaintiffs in this case argued that the finance system was dis-
criminatory, in violation of the state and federal equal protec-
tion clauses as well as the state education clause, and although 
141. Id. at 92 n.13. 
142. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979). 
143. Id. at 862. 
144. Id. at 874. 
145. Id. at 689. 
146. Id. at 877. See also Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1337 (citing the same). 
147. "Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every 
child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and 
divide numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the child will be 
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that affect 
his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total environmert 
to allow the child to intelligently choose life work to know his or her options; (5) 
work-training and advanced academic training as the child may intelligently choose; 
(6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as music, theatre, 
literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to 
facilitate compatibility with others in this society." ld. at 877. 
148. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
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the trial court agreed, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed 
the unconstitutionality of the school finance system solely and 
explicitly on grounds of the education clause, for failure to meet 
the "efficient" standard. 149 Although plaintiffs offered evidence 
that the educational offering was somewhat inadequate, the 
court emphasized even the equalitative evidence as establishing 
inadequacy. Recognizing that the education system was ranked 
in the lower 20-25% nationally, 150 and that poorer districts had 
poorer curricula, test scores, and opportunities, the court ex-
plained: there is a "definite correlation between the money 
spent per child on education and the quality of the education 
received." 151 Building on this evidence and plaintiff's adequacy 
claims, the court referred to the eight elements mandated by 
the West Virginia court, and then established for Kentucky an 
extensive list of its own, what one author has called a "wide-
ranging and ambitious standard for what the schools must 
achieve." 152 
4. McDuffy u. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educa-
tion.153 Plaintiffs specifically pled along the lines of the Ken-
tucky court's holding that all individuals had a right to an ade-
quate education. 154 Accordingly, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court chose to focus on plaintiffs' education clause argument, to 
determine whether the state constitution created a duty to pro-
vide an "adequate" education155 and whether the state system 
as a whole had fulfilled that duty. 156 Carefully and extensively 
the court worked with the education clause language, reviewing 
constitutional and legislative history and defining and holding 
mandatory both the duty to provide an "adequate" 157 education, 
to "cherish" 158 it, and to promote it for the "protection of rights 
149. Id. at 215. (The court emphasized that the education clause was the sole 
grounds for the decision over four times in the opinion). See also Stark, supra note 
49, at 28. 
150. 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989). 
151. ld. at 198. 
152. Enrich, supra note 50, at 17 4. 
153. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). Another, almost identical opinion is Claremont 
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993) (the two states, once shared the 
same border, now share "nearly identical" education clauses, and the two decisions 
mirror each other, in approach, content, and time). 
154. ld. at 522. 
155. ld. at 519, 522. 
156. ld. at 548. 
157. Id. at 547. 
158. ld. at 523. 
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and liberties." 159 Thereafter, recognizing that the school system 
had provided inadequate school facilities, curricula, and staff, 160 
the court held that the "constitutional duty is not being cur-
rently fulfilled by the Commonwealth."161 The court also noted, 
the tie between quality and funding, which turned equalitative 
finance-related evidence into qualitative evidence.162 Finally, 
following the Washington court's precedent, and the precise 
language of the Kentucky court, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court established seven requisite capabilities of adequately 
educated students. 163 
An educated child must possess "at least the seven following 
capabilities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication 
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable students to make in-
formed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that 
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient 
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physi-
cal wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each 
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heri-
tage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced train-
ing in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each 
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) suf-
ficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts 
in surrounding states, in academics or in the job. 164 
5. Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Ev-
ans.165 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of equal protection/uniformity claims stating that 
Thompson v Engleking and other subsequent cases "mandate 
159. Id. at 523, 548. 
160. Id. at 553. 
161. Id. at 555. 
162. Id. at 552 ("It is also clear, however, that fiscal support, or the 
lack of it, has a significant impact on the quality of education each 
child may receive"). 
163. Id. at 554. 
164. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 522 
(Mass. 1993). 
165. 850 P.2d 724 (1993). 
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dismissal of the uniformity claim." 166 Accordingly, the court 
held "unequal per student expenditures between school dis-
tricts did not violate the education clause or equal protection 
clause."167 Then turning to plaintiffs' education clause/adequacy 
arguments, the court explained "we have further concluded that 
the plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven at trial, would 
entitle them to relief." 168 
Most scholars agree that these cases speak solely for the 
advancement of adequacy claims. For example Peter Enrich, 
speaking of the West Virginia, Kentucky, and Massachusetts 
cases: "these courts have simply, and boldly, taken it upon 
themselves to define the contours of educational adequacy." 169 
Allen W. Hubsch in conclusion explains that: 
The foregoing state cases indicate that successful claims based 
on the education articles must address the quality level of ed-
ucation assured to citizens by the state constitution .... They 
address issues of education quality rather than equality 
and ... answer the call of the United Sates Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez of the states to take responsiblity for what is essen-
tially a state function. 170 
Although some of these cases have much stronger fact scenarios 
than others, in every case the courts relied on plaintiffs' 
adequacy-based arguments and both equalitative and qualita-
tive evidence to show inadequacy. 
A careful review of these cases in light of the statistics pre-
sented above, shows that even though all school finance suits 
taken together offer only a forty-four percent chance of success, 
adequacy arguments drastically increase that percentage. 171 
Conversely equality arguments decrease a plaintiff's chance of 
success. As judges and scholars have stated and restated, this 
is a direct effect of the courts' desire to hear adequacy-based 
arguments. 
166. !d. at 730. 
167. !d. 
168. !d. 
169. Enrich, supra note 50, at 17:3 (the other cases Enrich refers to favorably in 
his Appendix). 
170. Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1341. 
171. See generally Appendix. 
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27 
Without question, the group of cases with the highest suc-
cess rate have been those decided solely on grounds of ade-
quacy. Claims stated purely in terms of equality have not been 
a close second. However, the largest group, in terms of sheer 
numbers of successful plaintiffs, has used a hybrid approach. 172 
A hybrid suit combines the equal protection/equality claim with 
the education clause/adequacy claim. Such an approach has 
proven to be a very successful and flexible alternative. 173 
The hybrid suit is essentially an education clause/adequacy 
suit, using the language of equality as "just one measure of ade-
quacy"174 to advance the quality of education. Whether the liti-
gant seeks equitable taxing and spending methods or a better 
quality of education, the litigant will be more successful by al-
leging inadequacy of education. 175 And with the flexibility of the 
hybrid approach, the litigant can make use of qualitative as 
well as equalitative evidence to show such inadequacy. In other 
words, with a hybrid approach, a plaintiff may allege inade-
quacy but offer proof of a disparate educational offering or edu-
cational funding. Combined with evidence of inadequacy, the 
evidence of disparity bolsters the claim of poor and inadequate 
education. 
Scholars often call attention to the courts' confusion of the 
issues; equality arguments and evidence are mixed with ade-
quacy arguments and evidence. 176 For instance, one scholar 
takes great pains to note the reluctance of both the courts and 
plaintiffs to let go of the equal protection clause challenge in 
exchange for the adequacy arguments of the education clause. 177 
While admitting the truth of such reluctance, and the resulting 
confusion of the issues, one should not overlook the fact that 
courts in hybrid suits are using qualitative language to ground 
172. See Appendix. 
173. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 2. 
174. !d. at 4. 
175. See supra Parts III and IV. 
176. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 3. 
177. See generally Enrich, supra note 50. 
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their opinions even when plaintiffs present equalitative proof, 178 
and such suits are relatively successful. 
To yield such favorable opinions to plaintiffs, courts have 
generally looked at two ideas. First, courts have held that evi-
dence of a disparate or unequal education, is evidence that the 
education is not comparable and therefore not adequate. In the 
New Jersey opinions, a child's education was not adequate be-
cause of the extensive disparities which made the education 
uncompetitive in the market, as compared to other school dis-
trict offerings. 179 Accordingly, an adequate education is a com-
petitive education; to be competitive, you must be somewhere in 
the range of others and somewhat equal to others. Therefore, 
with this analysis, a plaintiff alleging inadequacy can use evi-
dence of disparities to bolster proof of inadequacy. 
Second, although scholars, courts, and common sense know 
full well that money does not necessarily equate strictly with 
quality, numerous courts have been quick to recognize the tie 
between funding and the adequacy of the educational out-
come.180 In a Minnesota case, for instance, the court stated that 
"in every case from another state in which a violation of a state 
constitutional provision was found, there were inadequacies in 
the levels of basic funding, and, consequently, a deficient over-
all level of education."181 A Tennessee court similarly explained 
that "The evidence indicates a direct correlation between dol-
lars expended and the quality of education a student re-
ceives."182 Both the Minnesota and Tennessee courts, as with 
many others courts, have decided upon grounds of adequacy, 
while making use of plaintiff's financial proof under an equality 
claim. This is continually the case; courts are finding reasons to 
decide on grounds of adequacy. 
178. See generally, cases outlined at the end of this section. 
179. See, for instance, Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. 
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J. 1990). 
180. For example, see Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 
806, 814 n.7 (1994) (finding the relationship to be "intuitive"); Alabama Coalition for 
Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, 115 (Ala. 1993) ("accepts the view that there is a 
positive correlation between spending on education and student performance"); Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 78 (1978); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 
P.2d 635, 642 (Idaho 1975); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
50 (1973). 
181. Skeen v. State of Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 311 (1993) (citing to four 
other prominent cases). 
182. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 144 (1993). 
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1. Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson !'). 183 The school finance 
system was first challenged with equal protection/equality ar-
guments, stating that the revenue system discriminated and 
established unequal burdens. The court explained that 
[w]e hesitate to turn this case upon the State equal protection 
clause. The reason is that the equal protection clause may be 
unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical an-
swers in the vast area of human needs .... we will not pursue 
the equal protection issue in the limited context of public edu-
cation.184 
The system was also challenged with education 
clause/adequacy arguments alleging that the state did not fur-
nish a "thorough and efficient system." Regarding educational 
adequacy, the court first recognized the tie between 
equalitative financing and constitutional standards of ade-
quacy: 
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been 
met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per 
pupil. We agree .... The constitutional mandate could not be 
said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose the unlikely 
proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance hap-
pens to coincide with the constitutional mandate. 185 
Although the court did not require equality of funding, it con-
sidered the evidence of inequality. 186 The court emphasized 
heavily that the opinion was based on qualitative analysis. It 
stated, "Rather than on equality, our decision was based on the 
proposition that the Constitution required a certain level of ed-
ucation, that which equates with thorough and efficient; it is 
that level that all must attain; that is the only equality re-
quired by the constitution."187 
2. Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott l'). 188 Mter reviewing the basis 
for decision in both Robinson I and Robinson V-that "a thor-
ough and efficient education requires a certain level of educa-
183. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
184. Id. at 287-83. 
185. Id. at 295. 
186. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 873 \W.Va. 1979). See also Stark, supra 
note 49, at 632. 
187. See Abbott v .Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 368 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I). 
188. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
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tiona! opportunity, a minimum level, that will equip the stu-
dents to become 'a citizen and ... a competitor in the labor mar-
ket,' "189-the New Jersey Supreme Court once again reviewed 
the evidence before them. The court noted that plaintiffs offered 
evidence "more than sufficient to prove the constitutional defi-
ciency in a limited number of [poorer]districts." 190 Specifically, 
this equalitative evidence showed that poorer districts failed to 
offer basic courses such as "art, music, drama, athletics, even to 
a very substantial degree, of science and social studies." 191 
Nonetheless, the court refused to overturn the school finance 
system and find for plaintiffs based on the general disparities 
and inequalities of the state school system as a whole, without 
evidence of inadequacy. 192 The court found that qualitative evi-
dence within the disparity of poorer schools: facilities were run 
down, heating was inadequate, and computer training was ex-
tremely limited. 193 The court continued to refer to the dispari-
ties, but gave their words teeth by tying both equalitative and 
qualitative evidence to constitutional standards of educational 
adequacy. In other words, once the court found that "the level of 
education offered to students in some of the poorer urban dis-
tricts is tragically inadequate,"194 the court did not hesitate to 
take action, and used all tools possible, both qualitative and 
equalitative arguments and evidence, to find the school finance 
system unconstitutional. The court was recognizing the hybrid 
tie: "We find that under the present system the evidence com-
pels but one conclusion: the poorer the district and the greater 
its need, the less the money available, and the worse the educa-
tion. That system is neither thorough nor efficient."195 
3. Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby 
("Edgewood !'). 196 Some sixteen years after Rodriguez, the Su-
preme Court of Texas invalidated its state school finance sys-
tem with the aid of adequacy arguments. The court dropped all 
equal protection and due process claims and proceeded solely 
189. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I). 
190. !d. at 400. 
191. /d. at 398. 
192. /d. at 392. 
193. !d. at 395-396. 
194. /d. 
195. /d. at 363. See also Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994) ("Abbott 
II") (recognizing the same tie). 
196. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
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under plaintiffs' education clause/inequality and inadequacy 
claims. Plaintiffs presented proof of "glaring disparities" placing 
property wealth on a 700 to 1 ratio for tax revenues and per 
pupil expenditures ranging from $2,112 to $19,333. 197 Plaintiffs 
also presented evidence of "dramatic" inadequacies such as the 
inability to maintain chemistry, physics, calculus, preparatory 
or honors programs, and extra curricular activities, as well as 
the constant oversized classes. 198 Upon such evidence, and after 
reviewing constitutional debates and legislative history, the 
court recognized the "implicit link that the Texas Constitution 
establishes between efficiency and equality." 199 Additionally, 
the court found a tie between another education clause phrase, 
"general diffusion of knowledge," and a "substantially equal 
opportunity to have access to educational funds." 200 Thereupon, 
the court found the school finance system unconstitutional and 
affirmed the injuction to fund such a system. 
This opinion represents the rare case, where the plaintiff's 
claim is so compelling that the court could find for the plaintiff 
on almost any grounds. However, the court rejected the equal 
protection and due process and proceeded under the education 
clause. The court used mostly the language of equality, though 
qualitative arguments could have as easily been made and sup-
ported. As is typical of hybrid cases the court explained that if 
education isn't competitive in today's world, it isn't up to the 
constitutional level. Therefore, because the "differences in the 
quality of educational programs offered are dramatic," the court 
found the school finance system unconstitutional. 201 
4. Edgewood Independent School District u. Kirby 
("Edgewood If'). 202 Two years after Edgewood I, the legislature 
had minimally modified the school finance system, and the 
Texas Supreme Court restated its injunction of the unconstitu-
tional school finance system as it was relatively unchanged. 
5. Edgewood Independent School District u. Meno 
("Edgewood Ill'). 203 clarifies and follows the holdings of the pre-
vious Edgewood cases. First, addressing the argument brought 
197. Jd. at 392. 
198. Id. at 393. 
199. Jd. at 397. 
200. ld. 
201. ld. at 393. 
202. 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
203. 893 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1994). 
32 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1997 
by the "property poor school districts" regarding the efficiency 
of the legislative response, the court explained that equality 
applied only to the funding necessary to reach the constitu-
tional level of quality, and not beyond.204 In other words, Texas 
citizens are all entitled to an adequate education as defined by 
the constitution. The court found that the school finance system 
provided adequate funding allowing all schools to attain the 
constitutional level, and any "[d]istricts that choose to tax 
themselves at a higher rate under these laws are, under this 
record, simply supplementing an already efficient system."205 
On this basis, the court rejected plaintiffs equal protection ar-
guments.206 The court held the school finance system "constitu-
tional in all respects,"207 and noted that the school finance 
plaintiff's challenge to the adequacy of the facilities failed only 
because of an evidentiary void."208 
6. Alabama Coalition for Equity Inc. v. Hunt. 209 Relying on 
grounds of equal protection/eqality, education clause/adequacy, 
as well as due process the Alabama Supreme Court illustrated 
that state education was both inequitable and inadequate. Re-
garding inadequacy, the court found shortages of classrooms, 
computers, science classes, gym facilities, and basic courses. 
They also found the existence of unsanitary conditions, leaky 
roofs, and, in one instance, potable water was not available. 210 
Schools were full of inequities due to the same inadequacies, 
essentially dividing the 'haves and the have-nots."211 Not sur-
prisingly, the court, several times, established the link between 
funding and adequate schooling: "The quality of educational 
opportunities available to a child in the public schools of Ala-
bama depends upon the fortuitous circumstances of where that 
child happens to reside and attend school."212 
Responding to the governor's argument that "Alabama can-
not afford to fund its schools adequately," the court answered, 
in part with testimonies offered, "what the state does not pay 
204. ld. at 465. 
205. ld. at 466. 
206. ld. at 480. 
207. ld. at 484. 
208. Id. at 459. 
209. 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993). 
210. Id. at 128-32. 
211. ld. at 124. 
212. ld. at 124-125. 
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for now in quality education, it pays for later in welfare, lost 
jobs, and prison costs."213 Additionally, the court stated that 
"[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that consti-
tutional obligations cannot be avoided because of a lack of fund-
ing."214 Then, finally, after reviewing the Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Kentucky, and New Jersey cases, the court established 
nine extensive elements of "adequate educational opportuni-
ties"215 advancing the quality of the state's educational offering. 
It is true that these hybrid suits are using equalitative ar-
guments and evidence. But these equality arguments are some-
times easier to prove. Such decisions consistently recognize the 
tie between money spent and the quality of the education re-
ceived. Equality arguments, in such cases, are rarely advanced 
under equal protection clauses, but instead under an education 
clause/adequacy argument, as a simple sign of contrast between 
districts meeting constitutional qualitative mandates vs dis-
tricts not meeting constitutional qualitative mandates. One 
New Jersey case illustrates 
On this record we find a constitutional deficiency only in the 
poorer urban districts, and our remedy is limited to those dis-
tricts. We leave unaffected the disparity in substantive educa-
tion and funding found in other districts throughout the state, 
although that disparity too may some day become a matter of 
constitutional dimension .... Our decision deals not with opti-
mum educational policy but with constitutional compliance.216 
Indeed these cases use, in part, a somewhat equalitative analy-
sis, but as expressly stated by this New Jersey court, their aim 
and decision is based on the education clause and its standards 
of educational adequacy.217 
Unquestionably the mix of equalitative and qualitative anal-
ysis can become rather confusing and blurred. However, these 
hybrid cases firmly illustrate that when adequacy is argued and 
alleged and backed with either qualitative or equalitative evi-
dence, plaintiffs are extremely successful. Hybrid cases which 
have failed-or any case alleging adequacy, that has failed-fail 
213. Id. at 145. 
214. Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Monson, 554 F.Supp 1275, 1304 (D. Conn. 1982), 
af('d, 714 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
215. ld. at 166. 
216. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990). 
217. Id. at 362-63. See also Stark, supra note 49, at 658. 
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for one reason: plaintiffs simply did not offer qualitative evi-
dence or did not relate equalitative evidence to the adequacy of 
the educational offering. This failure to offer or evaluate evi-
dence in a qualitative manor accounts for all unsuccessful hy-
brid cases.218 However, in many of these unsuccessful hybrid 
cases,219 it seems from the opinions that evidence was available, 
if plaintiffs had only relied more on their adequacy arguments 
and used the same equalitative evidence to show that the defi-
ciencies and inequalities actually resulted in inadeqacy of their 
schools. 
PART VI: GETTING To THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
Several reasons account for equal protection/equality and 
equal protection/uniforminty arguments being less successful 
than education clause/adequacy claims. One problem is that 
equality-based arguments do not cut quite as deeply into the 
heart of the issue-the educational needs of children-where 
the courts appear to be more sensitive. A second, and closely 
related problem, is the separation of power issues inherent in 
equality/finance arguments which inevitably place courts on the 
boundary between legislative and judicial duties. 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
1. LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING 
Because education litigation is inevitably school finance liti-
gation, plaintiffs often look to the funding or spending side of 
education for their arguments. Their claims are often fraught 
with issues of taxation, spending, and implementation. This 
threatens the political balance because separation of powers is 
viola ted. 22° Funding or spending claims raise policy decisions 
218. Jenkins v. Leininger, 659 N.E.2d 1366, 1371 (Ill. 1995); Edgewood Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1994) (opinion republished as modified 
1996); Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (Wash. 1974); 
Robinson v. Cahill, :~55 A.2d 129 (N .• J. 1976) ("Robinson V") (didn't consider facts, only 
whether legislative response would work if fully funded); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 
S.E.2d. 156, 165 (Ga. 1981). 
219. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 161 (Ga. 1981) (Same facts 
could have been used to show inadequacy). 
220. Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1174-75 (Kan. 1994) ("[i]t is not 
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for which the legislature was designed. 221 For that reason, when 
plaintiffs fail to get beyond mere finance issues, failing to allege 
and prove that the taxation disparities effect the quality of edu-
cation, courts are also more hesitant to speak strongly for plain-
tiffs. 
For instance, several courts have explained that they cannot 
consider whether one funding policy would be better than an-
other. 222 Instead, they can consider whether the present fund-
ing method satisfies the provision of equality, meaning general 
equality. 223 Perhaps this is one reason why courts refuse tore-
quire strict equality in school finance, refusing to disturb the 
status quo except in the face of glaring inequality. This legiti-
mate judicial reluctance is essentially a reaction to plaintiffs 
putting the courts on the line intended to separate governmen-
tal powers, by continually asserting the legislative questions of 
equal protection arguments. 
Courts not expressly recognizing the separation of powers 
problems are alternatively recognizing the problem of imple-
menting equalization solutions. 224 So in one way or another, 
this separation of powers problem is one of the reasons equal 
protection theories have fared as poorly as they have. 225 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Alternatively, with a strong historical basis, one argument 
has surpassed the separation of powers problem for the school 
finance litigant. As federal courts have long held it their duty to 
interpret the U.S. Constitution,226 likewise state courts have 
held it their duty, on an even greater scale, to interpret their 
for this court to set policy or to substitute its opinion for that of the legislature ... 
courts must guard against substituting their views on economic or social policy for 
those of the legislature. Courts are only concerned with the legislative power to enact 
statutes, not with the wisdom behind those enactments"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973). See also Natapoff, supra note .3, at 11. 
221. See, e.g., Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1326; Enrich, supra note 50, at 115. 
222. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981). 
223. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 299 v. State of Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1184 (1994). 
224. Natapoff. supra note 3, at 7. 
225. See Part V (statistics showing that litigants who rely wholly upon equality 
arguments are faced with nearly a seventy-five percent chance of failure). See also 
Appendix. 
226. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
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individual state constitutions. 227 These arguments have natu-
rally found their way into school finance litigation due to the 
increasing use of the education clause in every state constitu-
tion, thus providing for the expansion of judicial intervention. 228 
As all fifty states have education clauses within their state 
constitutions, it becomes the province of the judiciary to inter-
pret those clauses and to define their depth and breadth. The 
judiciary can define the terms and thereby declare the constitu-
tionality of subsequent action taken thereunder. 229 In one prom-
inent school finance case, dealing specifically with the adequacy 
argument of the state's education clause, the court declared: 
"To avoid deciding the case because of 'legislative discretion,' 
'legislative function,' etc., would be a denigration of our own 
constitutional duty. To allow the General Assembly (or, in point 
of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are consti-
tutional is literally unthinkable."230 
The courts have been consistent on this point; it is a judicial 
not legislative duty to interpret the state constitution. The is-
sue is often not so easily solved, however. The power of the judi-
ciary under school finance litigation is frequently limited, not 
by the court's jurisdiction, but by the plaintiffs themselves who 
confuse the issues and obscure the separation of governmental 
powers. 
3. EDUCATION CLAUSE SOLUTION 
The education clause/adequacy claim takes the court away 
from that borderline and back into the court's declared jurisdic-
tion, constitutional interpretation. The education clause gives 
the courts concrete language with which to work, terms to 
which the facts of the case can be manageably compared, and 
227. See Natapoff supra note 3, at 2 ("State courts have greater authority and 
ability to participate in educational decision making than their federal counterparts"). 
See also Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (citing to 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989) (stating "that courts 
may, should, and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a 
constitutionally mandated educational system"). See also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
State, 585 P.2d 71, 83, 87, 88 (Wash. 1978). 
228. Natapoff, supra note 3, at 8, 10. 
229. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). 
230. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989) (cited in 
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); also citing to Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 (Wash. 1978)). 
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standards to which educational outcomes can be measured.231 
Such constitutional grounds, like the qualitative standards of 
the education clause, are always stronger than policy grounds 
because such language gives the courts a measuring stick and 
leaves them to constitutional interpretation. 
In a Washington case, plaintiffs proffered their arguments 
under what is perhaps the most zealous education clause, and 
alleged appropriate facts as to the inadequacy of the educa-
tional offering. The Washington Supreme Court decided the 
case squarely on the same ground, specifically declaring that 
there was no separation of powers problems: 
[T]he judiciary has the ultimate power and the duty to inter-
pret, construe and give meaning to words, sections and arti-
cles of the [state's] constitution .... Once it has been deter-
mined that the court has the power or the duty to construe or 
interpret words or phrases in the constitution and to give 
them meaning and effect by construction, it becomes a judicial 
issue rather than a matter to be left to legislative 
discretion ... [and subsequently] there remains no separation 
of powers issue.232 
Though it may be true that most education cases feel the 
heat of separation of powers issues, plaintiffs that give the 
court a road of adjudication clearly within its jurisdiction and 
responsibility, as did the Washington plaintiffs, most often lead 
the court to a decision in favor of the education clause. Indeed, 
as claims come nearer to a constitutional basis, and away from 
a nonjusticiable policy basis-a which-tax-system-is-better 
basis-the courts are naturally more anxious to find relief for 
plaintiffs. 233 
Simply put, if the litigant only wants to be taxed equally, 
courts are very hesitant to intervene and overturn the effort of 
legislatures and their subsequent school finance systems. The 
decisions of the courts in strict equality based suits illustrate 
this fact. Conversely, when the litigant draws upon the state 
231. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 
(Ariz. 1994) ("where the constitution specifically addresses the particular subject at 
issue, we must address that specific provision first .... We need not resort to the 
less specific provision unless the argument based on the more specific fails"). See also 
Enrich, supra note 50, at 27. 
232. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87·88 (Wash. 1978). See also 
Hubsch, supra note 5, at 1327. 
233. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981). 
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constitution's education clause and challenges the school fi-
nance system on the grounds that the system does not meet the 
minimal constitutional standard of quality, litigants have been 
almost twice as successful. 234 
B. QUALITY: THE CONTROLLING ISSUE. 
Another limitation to the equality arguments of equal pro-
tection is that they do not drive deep enough. They often fail to 
get to the crux of the educational offering. Although equality 
arguments, "have a certain allure, the education provisions are 
better suited to this type of litigation."235 Even the courts have 
recognized that equal protection/equality theories tend to be 
surface level attempts based on traditional language without a 
strong and direct attack on the system's actual shortcomings. 
The language of equality is a historical monument, but the lan-
guage of adequacy is a mark of what a child receives when he 
goes to school each day. 
An Alabama court has stated, "It would, of course, be possi-
ble for the state to offer plaintiffs equal educational opportunity 
but still offer them virtually no opportunity at all."236 This 
statement reveals, in part, the limitations of equality claims. It 
also reveals the fact that equality is often not the ultimately 
desired end. Recognizing such, courts continually explain that 
they cannot find unconstitutional a level of equality that does 
not effect the actual quality of the educational opportunity. For 
instance, a Nebraska court explained that "[w]hile appellants' 
petition is replete with examples of disparity among the various 
school districts in Nebraska, they fail to allege in their petition 
how these disparities affect the quality of education the stu-
dents are receiving." 237 
On the other hand, adequacy arguments founded upon an 
"explicit and straightforward textual source" which is "unques-
tionably addressed to the status of the public schools" are much 
more manageable, more specific, and more fully directed to the 
234. Plaintiffs who have made use of adequacy arguments have found success 
seventy-four percent of the time, while plaintiffs who rely solely on equality 
arguments are successful only twenty-six percent of the time. See also Appendix. 
235. Stark, supra note 49, at 626. 
236. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993). 
237. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993). See notes 72-76 and 
accompanying text. 
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actual quality of the school systems themselves.238 The state is 
bound by the constitutional standards of quality, but the state 
is not bound to make all aspects of education equal. Moreover, 
provisions such as the recognition of education's effect upon 
government, liberties and general happiness, as well as the de-
lineation of required subjects, when combined with qualitative 
statements have been used as reliable judicial measuring sticks 
for the advancement of education.239 These measuring devices 
allow the court to get down and compare levels of educational 
adequacy to constitutional requirements, while leaving alone 
legislative questions offinance which are inevitably policy ques-
tions reaching far beyond the mark. 
The message from the courts is rather clear, adequacy is 
much more compelling and more substantial than is equality. 
"[D]efendant's opinions" do exist-overturning the school fi-
nance system with language strictly grounded in equality and 
equal protection.240 Typically, such suits have offered little pro-
tection for the educational experience of individual children, 
unless those claims have gotten to the heart of the educational 
experience and the adequacy of the education offered. 241 This is 
confirmed by the statistics of case history, as well as by the lan-
guage of the courts' opinions. Indeed, the qualitative standards 
of the state's education clauses "have provided courts with a 
more satisfactory basis for invalidating education financing sys-
tems."242 
PART VII: SUCCESS OF INDIVIDUAL CLAUSES 
The unsuccessful school finance litigation can be distin-
guished upon several grounds. First, as discussed above, plain-
tiffs have continually found unfavorable verdicts when they 
have failed to argue the correct theories and allegations, 
namely the education clause, whether alone or with the equal 
238. Enrich, supra note 50, at 167. 
239. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); 
McDuffy v. Secretary of Execute Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Rose 
v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); Serrano v. Priest, 557 
P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976). 
240. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Serrano v. Priest, 487 
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
241. See Appendix. 
242. Stark, supra note 49, at 631. 
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protection clause, accompanied by allegations of inadequacy. 
Another possible alternative to plaintiff's unsuccessful verdicts 
is the actual language of the particular state's education clause. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez emphasized 
the seriousness of the responsibilities vested with the states, 
which in turn raises several poignant questions: Does the par-
ticular state constitution actually reflect the desires of the 
state's citizens? Does the language of one education clause offer 
more or less protection than the language of another? Should 
the states look towards amending their constitutions? 
Several cases have recognized a correlation, albeit tenuous, 
between the language of a state's education clause and the suc-
cess of the suit. One court stated: 
In other jurisdictions much of the recent litigation has focused 
upon the education clauses of the various state constitutions 
and charters. However, analysis of these decisions reveals 
that each of these decisions is necessarily controlled by the 
particular wording of the state's education clause and, to a 
lesser extent, organization and funding. 243 
Dealing with an education clause containing minimal qualita-
tive language and a brief delineation of subjects, a Kansas court 
upheld its school finance system stating that "[s]uitability does 
not mandate excellence or high quality. In fact, suitability does 
not imply any objective, quantifiable education standard."244 A 
few other courts have, to some extent, followed suit. For in-
stance, a Georgia court upheld its school finance system, stat-
ing that the constitutional language only required an "ade-
quate" education. 245 Similarly a New York court, based on an 
education clause with no qualitative language, upheld its school 
finance system, requiring only a "sound, basic education."246 
Without further analysis, these cases might stand for the prop-
osition that education clause/adequacy arguments are only ef-
fective in those states which have strong qualitative language 
in their state constitutions. 
Although the language of these few cases may be read to 
suggest that the courts' decisions may have been different had 
243. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 299 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Kan. 1994). 
244. Id. at 1185. 
245. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981). 
246. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequalities Today v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1993). 
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the education clause been more bold in its wording, such is not 
necessarily conclusive. These cases may be distinguished on 
several grounds. First, each of these cases were argued on 
grounds of equal protection/equality. Second, the finder of facts 
in each of these cases stated that there was an absence of any 
allegation or proof marking the inadequacy of the system.247 As 
distinguished, these cases stand for the language of the Kansas 
court's suggestion; these cases reinforce the need to focus on 
adequacy, and further illustrate, that when adequacy is beyond 
proof, inequality will not pull the weight. Moreover, many cases 
have prevailed based on education clauses with minimal stan-
dards of quality. 248 Courts frequently construe weak education 
clause language to stand for strong educational ideals. One of 
many examples is that found in the Kentucky opinion. In that 
case, the court construed an "efficient" system to include: 
at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and 
written communication skills to enable students to function in 
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient oral 
and written communication skills to enable students to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmen-
tal processes to enable the student to understand the issues 
that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) suffi-
cient self knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable 
each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical 
heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable 
each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their coun-
24 7. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 299 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994); Refonn 
Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1993); McDaniel v. 
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981). 
248. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (relying on 
an education clause with no qualitative statements other than "liberal system," a 
phrase with arguable qualitative meaning); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 
v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (relying on the word "general" as qualitative 
standard); Rose v. Council for Better Edu., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (relying on the 
word "efficient"); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 1.'39 (1993) 
(with no qualitative statement, only a recognition of the inherent value of education, 
and the encouragement of its support, arguably issues of which any court would take 
judicial notice). 
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terparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job mar-
ket.249 
Most decisions, like this of the Kentucky court, rely on the in-
tentions of the constitutional writers as much as the constitu-
tional language itself, and thereby construe the education 
clause to reflect the inherent value of education. In effect, the 
courts are taking judicial notice of the prominent value of edu-
cation and using the mere existence of the education clause to 
advance education. 
An argument can be made that states should amend their 
constitutions, where necessary, to reflect the state's actual con-
cern and support for education. However, such an argument 
poses no threat to the stability of the education clause/adequacy 
theory as a whole. The entire trend of school finance litigation 
points to only one conclusion: the courts unanimously value 
education and lean towards the language of quality. The educa-
tion clause plays a large role in the courts' emphasis; the actual 
language of each clause, though important, seems to have been 
downplaye d by the simple fact that the courts have taken the 
education clauses as a sign of states' strong valuation of educa-
tion. The advancement of education is more stable and secure 
under the protection of even the weakest education clause than 
under any other theory. 
PART VIII: CONCLUSION 
"In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education."250 The protection and advancement of this vital 
concern is presently in the hands of the education 
clause/adequacy theory. Courts, scholars, and recent history all 
illustrate that the advancement of education through litigation 
249. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (A footnote 
explains "these seven characteristics should be considered as minimum goals")_ See 
also Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979) (construing "thorough and 
efficient" to include a laundry list of items similar to that in Rose); Alabama Coalition 
for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (interpreting "liberal" to mean 
"'generous,' 'bountiful,' and 'broad-based' in the sense of preparing one for future 
citizenship." The court then sets forth a laundry list even more extensive than that 
of Kentucky's). 
250. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 49:~ (1954). 
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has come to focus on adequacy, an argument for which there is 
no other hook but the education clause of every state's constitu-
tion. 
This is not to say that equal protection has no place in 
school finance litigation, but instead, that the trend is moving 
away from equal protection toward the education clause, away 
from equality and toward adequacy. At times equal protec-
tion/equality arguments may be the only theory or even the best 
theory, as is the case with a discrimination allegation, or when 
the plaintiffs interests are purely monetary, or when facts sim-
ply cannot support the inadequacy of education. However, a 
simple breakdown of the successful and unsuccessful school 
finance suits shows that adequacy pulls more weight and is vi-
tal to the courts' decisions. Equality arguments have alterna-
tively become appendages to adequacy arguments, using educa-
tional disparities to aid in the proof of poor quality. 
Several factors account for the shift to qualitative/adequacy 
emphasis. First, adequacy claims, which are strongly rooted in 
the state constitutions, require only that the court measure the 
educational offering up against the constitutional qualitative 
standards, and the constitutional intent-a job specifically tai-
lored for the courts. At the same time, the adequacy arguments 
avoid the legislative policy decisions of finance and equality. 
Second, adequacy claims get right to the heart of the education 
concern, the quality of education a child will receive. These fac-
tors provide courts with strong grounds for adjudication, with a 
clear view of this country's long-stressed valuation of education. 
The "how" of education protection and advancement, is 
therefore found in the education clause/adequacy claim. Statis-
tics, as well as academic and judicial writings, clearly stress 
this demand. Perhaps the future will bring a renewed move-
ment to force the constitutional language to reflect the true de-
sire of a state's citizens regarding the adequacy of education. 
But until then, the education clauses of the states appear to be 
doing exactly what Rodriguez had called for the states to pro-
tect and advance education through their own constitutions. 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a chart of school finance system litigation, 
from a plaintiff's view, broken up into the various types of 
claims: education clause/adequacy, hybrid, equal protec-
tion/equality, and equal protection/uniformity. The breakdown 
is not absolute; there is some room for difference of opinion. 
Moreover, statistically, the win/loss ratio and the favor-
able/unfavorable ratio are not strictly scientific. The fact that 
only twenty-seven out of sixty-one total school finance cases 
have been favorable to plaintiffs, is not in and of itself much of 
an indicator of the litigation field. Again, the fact that one hun-
dred percent of the cases dealing strictly with adequacy argu-
ments were successful, while only twenty-six percent of solely 
equality-based arguments were successful, does not account for 
the individual factual situations of the cases. Nonetheless, the 
following outlay does illustrate to some extent the simple idea 
that adequacy cases have represented a growing and successful 
trend in school finance system litigation. 
PLAINTIFFS' HISTORY OF ADEQUACY-BASED DECISIONS 
EDUCATION CLAUSE/ADEQUACY CLAIMS 
FAVORABLE: 
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615 
P.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
Claremont School District v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 
1993). 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 850 
P.2d 724 (1993). 
Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S. W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989). 
Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). 
UNFAVORABLE: 
None 
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HYBRID CLAIMS 
FAVORABLE: 
Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 
1995). 
Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 V. Bishop, 877 P.2d 
806 (Ariz. 1994). 
Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) ("Abbott II") 
Alabama Coalition for Equity Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 
1993). 
Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 
(1993). 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District v. 
Edgewood Independent School District, 826 S.W.2d 489 
(Tex. 1992). 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 
(Tex. 1991)("Edgewood II"). 
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) ("Abbott I"). 
Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1984). 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 
(Tex. 1989)("Edgewood I''). 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N .• J. 1973)("Robinson I"). 
UNFAVORABLE: (no proof of inadequacy) 
Jenkins v. Leininger, 659 N.E.2d 1366 (Ill. 1995). 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 
(opinion republished as modified 1996). 
Northshore School District No. 417 u. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 
(Wash. 1974). 
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976)("Robinson V''). 
Shofstall v. Hollins, 615 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 SE.2d. 156 (Ga. 1981). 
EDUCATION CLAUSE/UNIFORMITY CLAIMS 
FAVORABLE: 
Helena Elementary School District No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 
(Mont. 1989). 
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UNFAVORABLE: 
Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). 
Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education, 357 S.E.2d 
432 app. dismissed, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987). 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758 
(Md. 1983) . 
. . EDUCATION CLAUSE/ UNIFORMITY CLAIM & EQUAL PROTEC-
TION/EQUALITY CLAIM 
FAVORABLE: 
Dupree v. Alma School District, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). 
Bismarck Public School District No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 
(N.D. 1994). 
UNFAVORABLE: 
Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. 1995). 
Sheff v. O'Neill, 1995 WL 230992 (Conn. 1995). 
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). 
Unified School District v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994). 
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993). 
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today v. Cuorno, 199 
A.D.2d 488 (N.Y. 1993). 
Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 
(Or. 1991). 
Kukor v .Grover, 436 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. 1989). 
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988). 
Fair School Finance Council v. State, 7 46 P.2d 1135 
(Okla.1987). 
East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. 
1984). 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758 
(Md. 1983). 
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 
(Colo. 1982). 
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 
359 (N.Y. 1982). 
Board of Education v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979). 
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Penn. 1979). 
Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976). 
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Thompson u. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975). 
EQUAL PROTECTION/EQUALITY 
FAVORABLE: 
Exira Community School District u. State, 512 N.W.2d 787 
(Iowa 1994). 
Butt u. State, 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992). 
Horton u. Mesl-lill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977)("Horton I"). 
Washakie County School District No. 1 u. Herschler, 606 P.2d 
310 (Wyo. 1980). 
Serrano u. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976)("Serrano II"). 
Milliken u. Walsh, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972)("Milliken I"). 
Serrano u. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)("Serrano I"). 
UNFAVORABLE: 
School Administrative District No.1 u. Commissioner, Depart-
ment of Education, 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995). 
Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993). 
Shofstall u .Hollins, 615 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). 
Serrano u. Priest, 226 Cal.Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1986)("Serrano 
III"). 
Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985)("Horton II"). 
People ex rel. Jones u .Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976). 
Milli!?en u. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1973)("Milliken II"). 
SUCCESS RATIOS 
Total: 
Solely on adequacy arguments: 
Adequacy arguments and 
equality arguments: 
Solely on equality arguments: 
27 of 61 
5 of5 
12 of 18 
10 of 38 
44% 
100% 
66% 
26% 
